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It is known that linear-time temporal logic (LTL), which is an extension of classical
logic, is useful for expressing temporal reasoning as investigated in computer science.
In this paper, two constructive and bounded versions of LTL, which are extensions of
intuitionistic logic or Nelson’s paraconsistent logic, are introduced as Gentzen-type sequent
calculi. These logics, IB[l] and PB[l], are intended to provide a useful theoretical basis
for representing not only temporal (linear-time), but also constructive, and paraconsistent
(inconsistency-tolerant) reasoning. The time domain of the proposed logics is bounded
by a ﬁxed positive integer. Despite the restriction on the time domain, the logics can
derive almost all the typical temporal axioms of LTL. As a merit of bounding time, faithful
embeddings into intuitionistic logic and Nelson’s paraconsistent logic are shown for IB[l]
and PB[l], respectively. Completeness (with respect to Kripke semantics), cut–elimination,
normalization (with respect to natural deduction), and decidability theorems for the newly
deﬁned logics are proved as the main results of this paper. Moreover, we present sound
and complete display calculi for IB[l] and PB[l].
In [P. Maier, Intuitionistic LTL and a new characterization of safety and liveness, in:
Proceedings of Computer Science Logic 2004, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 3210, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2004, pp. 295–309] it has been emphasized that
intuitionistic linear-time logic (ILTL) admits an elegant characterization of safety and
liveness properties. The system ILTL, however, has been presented only in an algebraic
setting. The present paper is the ﬁrst semantical and proof-theoretical study of bounded
constructive linear-time temporal logics containing either intuitionistic or strong negation.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Constructive linear-time temporal logics
It is known that linear-time temporal logic (LTL) is very useful for verifying and specifying concurrent systems [8]. Gentzen-
type sequent calculi for LTL and its neighbors have been introduced by many researchers. For example, a sequent calculus
LTω for LTL, which is precisely a system for Kröger’s inﬁnitary temporal logic [18], was introduced by Kawai [17], who proved
cut–elimination and completeness theorems for this calculus. An alternative proof of the cut–elimination theorem for LTω
was given by introducing an embedding of LTω into a sequent calculus for inﬁnitary logic, see [15].
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intuitionistic logic and Nelson’s paraconsistent logic rather than inﬁnitary logic, are studied. The ﬁrst one, which is an
extension of intuitionistic logic, is called intuitionistic bounded linear-time temporal logic (denoted as IB[l]), and the second
one, which is an extension of Nelson’s paraconsistent logic N4 [2,21,33], is called paraconsistent bounded linear-time temporal
logic (denoted as PB[l]). Completeness (w.r.t. Kripke semantics), embedding, cut–elimination, normalization (w.r.t. natural
deduction) and decidability theorems for IB[l] and PB[l] are proved as the main results of this paper. The logics IB[l] and
PB[l] are intended to give a useful theoretical basis for adequately representing not only temporal (linear-time), but also
constructive and paraconsistent (inconsistency-tolerant) reasoning.
Whereas the Hilbert-style axiom scheme for the temporal operators G (globally) and X (next): Gα ↔ (α ∧ Xα ∧ X2α ∧
· · ·∞), where Xiα means
i
︷ ︸︸ ︷
XX · · ·Xα, is characteristic of LTω , the axiom scheme: Gα ↔ (α∧Xα∧X2α∧· · ·∧Xlα), which may
be regarded as a ﬁnite approximation of the original scheme, is characteristic of the logics IB[l] and PB[l]. Then the following
very informal correspondences are useful to understand these logics: Gα in LTω corresponds to the inﬁnite conjunction∧∞
j=0 X jα in inﬁnitary logic (extended by Xi), and Gα in IB[l] and PB[l] corresponds to the ﬁnite conjunction
∧l
j=0 X jα in
intuitionistic or Nelson’s paraconsistent logic (extended by Xi).
1.2. Why do we bound the time domain?
Although the standard LTL has an inﬁnite (unbounded) time domain, namely the set ω of all natural numbers, the logics
IB[l] and PB[l] have a bounded time domain which is restricted by a ﬁxed positive integer l, i.e., the set ωl := {x ∈ ω | x l}.
Despite the restriction on the time domain, IB[l] and PB[l] can derive almost all the typical temporal axioms of LTL, such as
a time induction axiom. As mentioned before, IB[l] and PB[l] allow us to obtain simple embeddings into intuitionistic logic
and Nelson’s paraconsistent logic, respectively. Using the embedding results, cut–elimination and decidability theorems for
these logics can be derived. Moreover, a completeness theorem (w.r.t. Kripke semantics) and a normalization theorem (w.r.t.
natural deduction) can be obtained. Such a theoretical merit may not be obtained for an unbounded and intuitionistic
version of LTL, because the unbounded time domain requires some inﬁnite inference rules. Such inﬁnite inference rules are
neither familiar to nor welcomed by researchers who study automated reasoning, since these rules cannot be implemented
eﬃciently. Indeed, the replacement of such inﬁnite rules of certain proof systems by ﬁnitary rules is known as an important
issue.
To restrict the time domain in LTL is not a new idea. Such an idea was discussed, for instance, in [5,7,12]. By using and
introducing a bounded time domain and the notion of bounded validity, bounded tableaux calculi (with temporal constraints)
for propositional and ﬁrst-order LTLs were studied by Cerrito, Mayer and Prand [7]. It is also known that to restrict the
time domain is a technique that may be applied to obtain a decidable or eﬃcient fragment of LTL [12]. Restricting the time
domain implies not only some purely theoretical merits as mentioned above, but also some practical merits for describing
temporal databases [7] and for implementing an eﬃcient model checking algorithm, called bounded model checking [5]. Such
practical merits are important due to the fact that there are problems in computer science and artiﬁcial intelligence where
only a ﬁnite fragment of the time sequence is of interest [7]. We hope that IB[l] and PB[l] provide a good proof-theoretical
basis for such practical applications as well as a good tool for automated reasoning with (bounded) linear-time formalisms.
1.3. Why do we use constructive and paraconsistent logics?
In (extensions of) standard classical propositional logic, the law of excluded middle α ∨¬α is valid. This means that the
information represented by classical logic is complete information: every formula α is either true or not true in a model.
Representing only complete information is plausible in classical mathematics, which is a discipline handling eternal truth
and falsehood. The statements of classical mathematics do not change their truth value in the course of time, and the
classical mathematician may assume every situation to support either the truth or the falsity of such a statement. The
assumption of complete information is, however, inadequate when it comes to representing the information available to real
world agents. We wish to explore the consequences of incomplete information about computer and information systems, and
then it is desirable to avail of a logic which is paracomplete in the sense of not validating the law of excluded middle [22,37].
For representing the development of incomplete information over time, it turned out that constructive logics are useful as
base logics for temporal reasoning. Indeed, constructive (intuitionistic) modal and temporal logics have been studied by several
researchers, the constructive concurrent dynamic logic of Wijesekera and Nerode [37] being just one example of such logics.
Particularly relevant for the present concerns is the intuitionistic linear-time temporal logic (ILTL) introduced in [19], which
is a system that can be used to express properties relating ﬁnite and inﬁnite behaviors. In [19], a logical characterization of
safety and liveness properties is given: For every formula α, α is (expresses) an intuitionistic safety (or liveness) property iff
(F⊥ → α) → α (or F⊥ → α, resp.) is valid in ILTL. Moreover, the following decomposition theorem holds: For every formula
α, α ↔ ((F⊥ → α) ∧ (F⊥ ∨ α)) is valid in ILTL. The system ILTL, however, is presented only in an algebraic setting. The
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We wish to handle inconsistent as well as incomplete information, since some real systems such as software systems need
to ensure inconsistency-tolerance. Paraconsistent model checking based on many-valued temporal logics, for instance, which was
suggested by Easterbrook and Chechik [10], is intended to represent inconsistent information for requirements elicitation
in software engineering. Whereas incomplete information calls for paracomplete logics, handling inconsistent information
within a logic requires paraconsistent logics such as Nelson’s N4, Dunn’s and Belnap’s four-valued logic, da Costa’s C systems,
or annotated logics. The present paper’s approach is based on N4, since N4 is known as a very useful paraconsistent logic
in philosophical logic, computer science, and AI (see, e.g., [22–24,32–34]) and because N4 is based on positive intuitionistic
logic. A systematic and historical survey of paraconsistent logic can be found in [26,27].
The idea of combining time with paraconsistency is not a new idea. In order to express inconsistent states in temporal
reasoning, annotated temporal logics ∗τ , which are combinations of annotated logics and LTL, were proposed by Abe and
Akama [1]. The motivation for using PB[l] in the present paper is basically the same as the motivation given in [1]. Whereas
Abe and Akama’s approach is only semantical, the present approach is both semantical and proof-theoretical. A general
theory of combining logics has been developed, for example, in [6].
2. Intuitionistic bounded linear-time temporal logic
2.1. Sequent calculus
Formulas of IB[l] are constructed from (countably many) propositional variables, ⊥ (the falsity constant), → (implication),
∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), G (globally), F (eventually) and X (next). Lower-case letters p,q, . . . are used to denote
propositional variables, Greek lower-case letters α,β, . . . are used to denote formulas, and Greek capital letters Γ,, . . . are
used to represent ﬁnite (possibly empty) sequences of formulas. For any  ∈ {G, F,X}, the expression Γ is used to denote
the sequence 〈γ | γ ∈ Γ 〉. The symbol ≡ is used to denote the equality of sequences of symbols. The symbol ω or N is
used to represent the set of natural numbers. Let l be a ﬁxed positive integer. The symbol ωl or Nl is used to represent the
set {i ∈ ω | i  l}. The expression Xiα for any i ∈ ω is inductively deﬁned by (X0α ≡ α) and (Xn+1α ≡ XnXα). Lower-case
letters i, j and k are used to denote any natural numbers. An expression of the form Γ ⇒  where  is empty or a single
formula is called a sequent (for IB[l]). An expression L  S is used to denote the fact that a sequent S is provable in a
sequent calculus L.
Deﬁnition 1 (IB[l]). Let l be a ﬁxed positive integer. In the following deﬁnition,  represents the empty sequence or a single
formula.
The initial sequents of IB[l] are of the following form, where p is any propositional variable:
Xi p ⇒ Xi p Xi⊥ ⇒
The structural rules of IB[l] are of the form:
Γ ⇒ α α,Σ ⇒ 
Γ,Σ ⇒  (cut)
Γ ⇒ 
α,Γ ⇒  (we-left)
Γ ⇒
Γ ⇒ α (we-right)
α,α,Γ ⇒ 
α,Γ ⇒  (co)
Γ,α,β,Σ ⇒ 
Γ,β,α,Σ ⇒  (ex)
The logical inference rules of IB[l] are of the following form, for any k ∈ωl and any positive integer m:
Γ ⇒ Xiα Xiβ,Σ ⇒ 
Xi(α→β),Γ,Σ ⇒  (→left)
Xiα,Γ ⇒ Xiβ
Γ ⇒ Xi(α→β) (→right)
Xiα,Γ ⇒ 
Xi(α ∧ β),Γ ⇒  (∧left1)
Xiβ,Γ ⇒ 
Xi(α ∧ β),Γ ⇒  (∧left2)
Γ ⇒ Xiα Γ ⇒ Xiβ
Γ ⇒ Xi(α ∧ β) (∧right)
Xiα,Γ ⇒  Xiβ,Γ ⇒ 
Xi(α ∨ β),Γ ⇒  (∨left)
Γ ⇒ Xiα
Γ ⇒ Xi(α ∨ β) (∨right1)
Γ ⇒ Xiβ
Γ ⇒ Xi(α ∨ β) (∨right2)
1 In [9], a Curry–Howard isomorphism for intuitionistic linear-time temporal logic in the language based on X and intuitionistic implication is established.
Note, however, that the author extends this positive constructive logic by classical negation and that he uses a natural deduction system with time-
annotated derivability relations inspired by [20]. Natural deduction proof systems and typed λ-calculi for bounded intuitionistic linear-time temporal logics
are surveyed in [16]. See also [3].
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Xl+mα,Γ ⇒  (Xleft)
Γ ⇒ Xlα
Γ ⇒ Xl+mα (Xright)
Xi+kα,Γ ⇒ 
XiGα,Γ ⇒  (Gleft)
{Γ ⇒ Xi+ jα} j∈ωl
Γ ⇒ XiGα (Gright)
{Xi+ jα,Γ ⇒ } j∈ωl
XiFα,Γ ⇒  (Fleft)
Γ ⇒ Xi+kα
Γ ⇒ XiFα (Fright)
Note that for any formula α, the sequent Xiα ⇒ Xiα is provable in IB[l]. This can be shown by induction on α. Thus, the
sequents of the form Xiα ⇒ Xiα can also be regarded as initial sequents.
It is remarked that IB[l] is just a logic parameterized by a ﬁxed concrete positive integer l. Thus, before any detailed
discussion, we have to ﬁx IB[l] as a concrete logic such as IB[5]. Indeed, for example, IB[2] is different from IB[1]: p ∧Xp ⇒
Gp is provable in IB[1], but it is not provable in IB[2]. A proof of p ∧ Xp ⇒ Gp in IB[1] is presented below:
p ⇒ p
Xp, p ⇒ p (we-left)
Xp ⇒ Xp
p,Xp ⇒ Xp (we-left)
Xp, p ⇒ Xp (ex)
Xp, p ⇒ Gp (Gright)
p ∧ Xp, p ⇒ Gp (∧left2)
p, p ∧ Xp ⇒ Gp (ex)
p ∧ Xp, p ∧ Xp ⇒ Gp (∧left1)
p ∧ Xp ⇒ Gp (co)
It is noted that (Gright) and (Fleft) have l + 1 (i.e., a ﬁnite number of) premises. In (Gleft) and (Fright), the number k is
bounded by l. Then IB[l] has the Hilbert-style axiom schemes Gα ↔ (α ∧ Xα ∧ X2α ∧ · · · ∧ Xlα) and Fα ↔ (α ∨ Xα ∨ X2α ∨
· · · ∨ Xlα). By (Xleft) and (Xright), the nest of the outermost occurrences of X in a formula can be bounded by l. Indeed,
(Xleft) and (Xright) correspond to the Hilbert-style axiom scheme Xl+mα ↔ Xlα.
We may regard IB[l] as an intuitionistic and bounded version of Kawai’s sequent calculus LTω for LTL [17]. LTω has no
l-bounded rules {(Xleft) (Xright)}, and uses ω instead of ωl .
Proposition 2. Let  be the empty sequence or a single formula. The rule of the form:
Γ ⇒ 
XΓ ⇒ X (Xregu)
is admissible in cut-free IB[l].
Proof. By induction on proofs P of Γ ⇒  in cut-free IB[l]. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P .
We show some cases.
Case (Xi⊥ ⇒). The last inference of P is of the form: Xi⊥ ⇒. In this case, we have IB[l]  XXi⊥ ⇒.
Case (Gleft). The last inference of P is of the form:
Xi+kα,Σ ⇒ 
XiGα,Σ ⇒  (Gleft)
By induction hypothesis, we obtain:
....
XXi+kα,XΣ ⇒ X
XXiGα,XΣ ⇒ X (Gleft)
Case (→left). The last inference of P is of the form:
Π ⇒ Xiα Xiβ,Σ ⇒ 
Xi(α→β),Π,Σ ⇒  (→left)
By induction hypothesis, we obtain:
....
XΠ ⇒ XXiα
....
XXiβ,XΣ ⇒ X
XXi(α→β),XΠ,XΣ ⇒ X (→left) 
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and KD, respectively:
Γ ⇒ α
XΓ ⇒ Xα
Γ ⇒ γ
XΓ ⇒ Xγ
where γ can be empty.
Proposition 3. An expression α ⇔ β means the sequents α ⇒ β and β ⇒ α. The following sequents are provable in IB[l], for any
formulas α,β and any i ∈ω:
1. Xi⊥ ⇔ ⊥,
2. Xi(α ◦ β) ⇔ Xiα ◦ Xiβ where ◦ ∈ {→,∧,∨},
3. XiGα ⇔ GXiα,
4. Gα ⇒ Xα,
5. Gα ⇒ XGα,
6. Gα ⇒ GGα,
7. α,G(α→Xα) ⇒ Gα (time induction),
8. Gα ⇔ α ∧ Xα ∧ X2α ∧ · · · ∧ Xlα,
9. Fα ⇔ α ∨ Xα ∨ X2α ∨ · · · ∨ Xlα,
10. Xl+iα ⇔ Xl+iGα,
11. Xl+iα ⇔ Xl+iFα,
12. Xl+iGα ⇔ Xl+iFα.
Proof. We show some cases.
(5)
....
Xα ⇒ Xα
Gα ⇒ Xα (Gleft)
....
X2α ⇒ X2α
Gα ⇒ X2α (Gleft) · · ·
....
Xnα ⇒ Xnα
Gα ⇒ Xnα (Gleft) · · ·
Gα ⇒ XGα (Gright)
(6)
Gα ⇒ Gα
....
Gα ⇒ XGα
....
Gα ⇒ X2Gα · · ·
....
Gα ⇒ XnGα · · ·
Gα ⇒ GGα (Gright)
where  Gα ⇒ X jGα for any j ∈ωl can be shown in a similar way as in (5).
(7) In the following proofs, the applications of (ex) are omitted.
....
{α,G(α→Xα) ⇒ Xkα}k∈ωl
α,G(α→Xα) ⇒ Gα (Gright)
where  α,G(α→Xα) ⇒ Xkα for any k ∈ωl is shown by mathematical induction on k as follows: the base step is obvious,
and the induction step can be shown by
.... ind.hyp.
α,G(α→Xα) ⇒ Xkα Xk+1α ⇒ Xk+1α
α,G(α→Xα),Xk(α→Xα) ⇒ Xk+1α (→left)
α,G(α→Xα),G(α→Xα) ⇒ Xk+1α (Gleft)
α,G(α→Xα) ⇒ Xk+1α (co)
(10)
....
Xlα ⇒ Xlα
{Xlα ⇒ Xl+ jα} j∈ωl
(Xright)
Xlα ⇒ XlGα (Gright)
Xlα ⇒ Xl+iGα (Xright)
Xl+iα ⇒ Xl+iGα (Xleft)
....
Xl+iα ⇒ Xl+iα
Xl+iGα ⇒ Xl+iα (Gleft) 
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(Gleft), (Gright), (Fleft), (Fright), and replacing Xi by X0. The modiﬁed inference rules for LJ by replacing i by 0 are denoted
by using “LJ” as a superscript, e.g., (→leftLJ).
Expressions like
∧{αi | i ∈ωl} and ∨{αi | i ∈ ωl} where {αi | i ∈ ωl} is a multiset mean α0 ∧ α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αl and α0 ∨ α1 ∨
· · · ∨ αl , respectively. For example, ∧{α,α,β} means α ∧ α ∧ β . The following deﬁnition of the embedding function f is
regarded as a ﬁnite analogue of the deﬁnition of the embedding function of LTω into inﬁnitary logic [15].
Deﬁnition 5. We ﬁx a countable nonempty set Φ of propositional variables and deﬁne the sets Φi := {pi | p ∈ Φ} (1 i ∈ω)
and Φ0 := Φ of propositional variables. The language LIB[l] of IB[l] is deﬁned by using Φ , ⊥,→,∧,∨, X,G and F. The
language LLJ of LJ is deﬁned by using
⋃
i∈ω Φi , ⊥,→,∧ and ∨.
A mapping f from LIB[l] to LLJ is deﬁned by the following clause, for any i ∈ω and any positive integer m:
1. f (Xi⊥) := ⊥,
2. f (Xi p) := pi ∈ Φi for any p ∈ Φ (especially, f (p) := p ∈ Φ0),
3. f (Xi(α ◦ β)) := f (Xiα) ◦ f (Xiβ) where ◦ ∈ {→,∧,∨},
4. f (Xl+mα) := f (Xlα),
5. f (XiGα) :=∧{ f (Xi+ jα) | j ∈ωl},
6. f (XiFα) :=∨{ f (Xi+ jα) | j ∈ωl}.
The expression f (Γ ) denotes the result of replacing every occurrence of a formula α in Γ by an occurrence of f (α).
Strictly speaking, the embedding function f strongly depends on the time bound l, i.e., f should be denoted as fl .
Indeed, f3(Gp) and f5(Gp) are different. But, for the sake of brevity, we will just use f in the following.
Theorem 6 (Embedding). Let Γ be a sequence of formulas in LIB[l] ,  be the empty sequence or a formula in LIB[l] , and f be the
mapping deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.
1. IB[l]  Γ ⇒  iff LJ  f (Γ ) ⇒ f ().
2. IB[l]-(cut)  Γ ⇒  iff LJ-(cut)  f (Γ ) ⇒ f ().
Proof. Since (2) follows from (1), we show only (1).
(⇒) By induction on proofs P of Γ ⇒  in IB[l]. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P and show
some cases.
Case (Xi p ⇒ Xi p). The last inference of P is of the form: Xi p ⇒ Xi p. In this case, we obtain f (Xi p) ⇒ f (Xi p), i.e., pi ⇒ pi
(pi ∈ Φi). This is an initial sequent of LJ.
Case (→left). The last inference of P is of the form:
Γ ⇒ Xiα Xiβ,Σ ⇒ 
Xi(α→β),Γ,Σ ⇒  (→left)
By induction hypothesis, we have LJ  f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xiα) and LJ  f (Xiβ), f (Σ) ⇒ f (). Then we obtain
....
f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xiα)
....
f (Xiβ), f (Σ) ⇒ f ()
f (Xiα)→ f (Xiβ), f (Γ ), f (Σ) ⇒ f () (→left
LJ)
where f (Xiα)→ f (Xiβ) = f (Xi(α→β)) by the deﬁnition of f .
Case (Xleft). The last inference of P is of the form:
Xlα,Γ ⇒ 
Xl+mα,Γ ⇒  (Xleft)
By induction hypothesis, we have LJ  f (Xlα), f (Γ ) ⇒ f (), and f (Xlα) = f (Xl+mα) by the deﬁnition of f . Thus, we obtain
LJ  f (Xl+mα), f (Γ ) ⇒ f ().
Case (Gleft). The last inference of P is of the form:
Xi+kα,Γ ⇒ 
XiGα,Γ ⇒  (Gleft)
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....
f (Xi+kα), f (Γ ) ⇒ f ().... (∧leftLJ)∧{ f (Xi+ jα) | j ∈ωl}, f (Γ ) ⇒ f ()
where
∧{ f (Xi+ jα) | j ∈ ωl} = f (XiGα) by the deﬁnition of f , and f (Xi+kα) is in the multiset { f (Xi+ jα) | j ∈ ωl}. It is
remarked that the case i > l is also included in this proof. In such a case, f (Xi+kα) and
∧{ f (Xi+ jα) | j ∈ωl} mean f (Xlα)
and
l
︷ ︸︸ ︷
f (Xlα)∧ f (Xlα)∧ · · · ∧ f (Xlα), respectively.
Case (Gright). The last inference of P is of the form:
{Γ ⇒ Xi+ jα} j∈ωl
Γ ⇒ XiGα (Gright)
By induction hypothesis, we have LJ  f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xi+ jα) for all j ∈ωl . Let Φ be the multiset { f (Xi+ jα) | j ∈ωl}. We obtain
....
{ f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xi+ jα)} f (Xi+ jα)∈Φ.... (∧rightLJ)
f (Γ ) ⇒∧Φ
where
∧
Φ = f (XiGα) by the deﬁnition of f .
(⇐) By induction on proofs Q of f (Γ ) ⇒ f () in LJ. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of Q , and
show only the following case.
Case (∧rightLJ). The last inference of Q is of the form:
f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xiα) f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xiβ)
f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xi(α ∧ β)) (∧right
LJ)
where f (Xi(α ∧ β)) = f (Xiα) ∧ f (Xiβ) by the deﬁnition of f . By induction hypothesis, we have IB[l]  Γ ⇒ Xiα and
IB[l]  Γ ⇒ Xiβ . Then we obtain
....
Γ ⇒ Xiα
....
Γ ⇒ Xiβ
Γ ⇒ Xi(α ∧ β) (∧right) 
Using this theorem, we can prove the following.
Theorem 7 (Cut-elimination). The rule (cut) is admissible in cut-free IB[l].
Proof. Suppose IB[l]  Γ ⇒ . Then we have LJ  f (Γ ) ⇒ f () by Theorem 6(1), and hence LJ-(cut)  f (Γ ) ⇒ f () by
the well-known cut–elimination theorem for LJ. By Theorem 6(2), we obtain IB[l]-(cut)  Γ ⇒ . 
Although in this paper the cut–elimination theorem for IB[l] is proved via an embedding theorem, a direct syntactical
cut–elimination proof for IB[l] may be obtained using the standard way of Gentzen.
Theorem 8 (Decidability). IB[l] is decidable.
Proof. By Theorem 6, provability in IB[l] can be reduced to provability in LJ. Since LJ is decidable, IB[l] is also decidable. 
2.2. Kripke semantics
The symbols  and  are used to represent the linear order on ω.
Deﬁnition 9. Let l be a ﬁxed positive integer. A Kripke frame is a structure 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 satisfying the following conditions.
1. M is a nonempty set.
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3. R is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation on M .
The set M can be understood as a set of information states, and the set N can be understood as a set of time points.
Deﬁnition 10. A valuation | on a Kripke frame 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 is a mapping from the set Ψ of all propositional variables to
the power set 2M×N of the direct product M × N such that for any p ∈ Ψ , any i ∈ N , and any x, y ∈ M , if (x, i) ∈ | (p) and
xRy, then (y, i) ∈ | (p). We will write (x, i) | p for (x, i) ∈ | (p). Each valuation | is extended to a mapping from the set
Φ of all formulas to 2M×N by the following clauses:
1. (x, i) | ⊥ does not hold,
2. (x, i) | α→β iff ∀y ∈ M [xRy and (y, i) | α imply (y, i) | β],
3. (x, i) | α ∧ β iff (x, i) | α and (x, i) | β ,
4. (x, i) | α ∨ β iff (x, i) | α or (x, i) | β ,
5. (x, i) | Xα iff (x, i + 1) | α,
6. (x, i) | Xlα iff (x, l) | α,
7. (x, i) | Gα iff ∀ j ∈ Nl [i  j implies (x, j) | α] if i < l, and otherwise (x, l) | α,
8. (x, i) | Fα iff ∃ j ∈ Nl [i  j and (x, j) | α] if i < l, and otherwise (x, l) | α.
Conditions 5 and 6 in Deﬁnition 10 are intended to express that for any positive integer m, (x, l +m) | α iff (x,0) |
Xl+mα iff (x,0) | Xlα iff (x, l) | α. The statement (x, i) | α can be read as “α is true at the information state x and the
time i.”
Proposition 11. Let | be a valuation on a Kripke frame 〈M,N,Nl, R〉. For any formula α, any i ∈ N, and any x, y ∈ M, if (x, i) | α
and xRy, then (y, i) | α.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of α. 
In the following discussion, Proposition 11 will often be used implicitly.
Note that the time-hereditary condition: ∀i, j ∈ N ∀x ∈ M [(x, i) | α and i  j imply (x, j) | α] is not assumed in this
semantics.
An expression Γ ∧ means γ1 ∧ γ2 ∧ · · · ∧ γn if Γ ≡ 〈γ1, γ2, . . . , γn〉 (0 n). Let  be the empty sequence or a sequence
consisting of a single formula. An expression ∗ means α or ⊥ if  ≡ 〈α〉 or ∅, respectively. An expression (Γ ⇒ )∗
means Γ ∧→∗ if Γ is not empty, and means ∗ otherwise.
Deﬁnition 12. A Kripke model is a structure 〈M,N,Nl, R, |〉 such that (1) 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 is a Kripke frame, and (2) | is a
valuation on 〈M,N,Nl, R〉.
A formula α is true in a Kripke model 〈M,N,Nl, R, |〉 if (x,0) | α for any x ∈ M , and valid in a Kripke frame
〈M,N,Nl, R〉 if it is true for any valuation | on the Kripke frame.
A sequent Γ ⇒  is true in a Kripke model 〈M,N,Nl, R, |〉 if the formula (Γ ⇒ )∗ is true in the Kripke model, and
valid in a Kripke frame 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 if it is true for any valuation | on the Kripke frame.
Theorem 13 (Soundness). Let C be the class of all Kripke frames, L := {Γ ⇒  | IB[l]  Γ ⇒ } and L(C) := {Γ ⇒  | Γ ⇒  is
valid in all frames of C}. Then L ⊆ L(C).
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that for any sequent Γ ⇒ , if IB[l]  Γ ⇒ , then Γ ⇒  is valid in 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 ∈ C , i.e.,
for any valuation | on 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 and any x ∈ M , (x,0) | Γ ⇒ . This is proved by induction on proofs P of Γ ⇒ 
in IB[l]. To show this, we distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . Since the proof is straightforward, we
show only the following cases.
Case (Gright): The last inference of P is of the form:
{Γ ⇒ Xi+ jα} j∈ωl
Γ ⇒ XiGα (Gright)
In the following, we consider only the case Γ = ∅. Let | be a valuation on 〈M,N,Nl, R〉. By the induction hypothesis, we
have ∀ j ∈ Nl ∀x ∈ M [(x,0) | Γ ⇒ Xi+ jα]. First, we show the case for i < l as follows. ∀ j ∈ Nl ∀x ∈ M [(x,0) | Γ ⇒ Xi+ jα]
iff ∀ j ∈ Nl ∀x ∈ M [(x,0) | Γ ∧→Xi+ jα] iff ∀ j ∈ Nl ∀x ∈ M ∀y ∈ M [xRy and (y,0) | Γ ∧ imply (y, i+ j) | α] iff ∀x, y ∈ M
[xRy and (y,0) | Γ ∧ imply ∀ j ∈ Nl [(y, i + j) | α]] iff ∀x, y ∈ M [xRy and (y,0) | Γ ∧ imply (y, i) | Gα] iff ∀x ∈ M
[(x,0) | Γ ⇒ XiGα]. Second, we consider the case for i  l as follows. This case can be shown similarly. The difference is
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iff (y, i) | Gα. Thus, we obtain the required fact.
Case (Xright): The last inference of P is of the form:
Γ ⇒ Xlα
Γ ⇒ Xl+mα (Xright)
In the following, we consider only the case Γ = ∅. Let | be a valuation on 〈M,N,Nl, R〉. By the induction hypothesis, we
have ∀x ∈ M [(x,0) | Xlα] where (x,0) | Xlα iff (x, l) | α iff (x,m) | Xlα iff (x,0) | Xl+mα. We thus obtain the required
fact that ∀x ∈ M [(x,0) | Xl+mα]. 
Prior to the detailed presentation of the completeness proof, we prove a Lindenbaum lemma.
Deﬁnition 14. Let x and y be sets of formulas. The pair (x, y) is consistent iff for any α1, . . . ,αm ∈ x and any β1, . . . , βn ∈ y
with (m,n 0), the sequent α1, . . . ,αm ⇒ β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βn is not provable in IB[l]. The pair (x, y) is maximal consistent iff it is
consistent and for every formula α, α ∈ x or α ∈ y.2
The following lemma can be proved using (cut).
Lemma 15. Let x and y be sets of formulas. If the pair (x, y) is consistent, then there is a maximal consistent pair (x′, y′) such that
x⊆ x′ and y ⊆ y′ .
Proof. Let γ1, γ2, . . . be an enumeration of all formulas of IB[l]. Deﬁne a sequence of pairs (xn, yn) (n = 0,1, . . .) inductively
by (x0, y0) := (x, y), and (xm+1, ym+1) := (xm, ym ∪ {γm+1}) if (xm, ym ∪ {γm+1}) is consistent, and (xm+1, ym+1) := (xm ∪
{γm+1}, ym) otherwise. We can obtain the fact that if (xm, ym) is consistent, then so is (xm+1, ym+1). To verify this, suppose
(xm+1, ym+1) is not consistent. Then there are formulas α1, . . . ,αi,α′1, . . . ,α′j ∈ xm and β1, . . . , βk, β ′1, . . . , β ′l ∈ ym such that
IB[l]  α1, . . . ,αi ⇒ β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βk ∨ γm+1 and IB[l]  α′1, . . . ,α′j, γm+1 ⇒ β ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ β ′l . By using (cut) and some other rules,
we can obtain IB[l]  α1, . . . ,αi,α′1, . . . ,α′j ⇒ β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βk ∨ β ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ β ′l . This contradicts the consistency of (xm, ym).
Hence, a pair (xk, yk) produced by the construction is consistent for any k. We thus obtain a maximal consistent pair
(
⋃∞
n=0 xn,
⋃∞
n=0 yn). 
We now start to prove the completeness theorem for IB[l].
The expression {Γ } means the set of all formulas occurring in Γ . Suppose that Γ ⇒  is not provable in IB[l]. Then the
pair ({Γ }, {}) is consistent. By Lemma 15, there is a maximal consistent pair (u, v) such that {Γ } ⊆ u and {} ⊆ v . Note
that if  ≡ 〈α〉, then α /∈ u by the consistency of (u, v).
Deﬁnition 16. Let ML be the set of all maximal consistent pairs. The binary relation RL on ML is deﬁned by (x,w)RL(y, z)
iff x⊆ y. The valuation |L (p) for any propositional variable p is deﬁned by {((x,w), i) ∈ ML × N | Xi p ∈ x}.
Lemma 17. The structure 〈ML,N,Nl, RL, |L〉 is a Kripke model such that for any formula α, any i ∈ N, and any (x,w) ∈ ML, Xiα ∈ x
iff ((x,w), i) |L α.
Proof. It can be shown that (1) ML is a nonempty set, because (u, v) ∈ ML by the discussion above, (2) RL is a reﬂexive
and transitive relation on ML , and (3) for any propositional variable p and any (x,w), (y, z) ∈ ML , if (x,w)RL(y, z) and
((x,w), i) |L (p), then ((y, z), i) |L (p). Thus, the structure 〈ML,N,Nl, RL, |L〉 is a Kripke model.
It remains to be shown that in this model, for any formula α, any i ∈ N , and any (x,w) ∈ ML , Xiα ∈ x iff ((x,w), i) |L α.
This is shown by induction on the complexity of α.
Base step. By Deﬁnition 16.
Induction step.
• Case α ≡ ⊥. By the consistency of (x,w), Xi⊥ ∈ x does not hold.
• Case α ≡ γ→δ. Suppose Xi(γ→δ) ∈ x. We will show ((x,w), i) |L γ→δ, i.e., ∀(y, z) ∈ ML [(x,w)RL(y, z) and
((y, z), i) |L γ imply ((y, z), i) |L δ]. Suppose (x,w)RL(y, z) and ((y, z), i) |L γ . Then we have (∗): Xi(γ→δ) ∈ y by
the deﬁnition of RL , and obtain (∗∗): Xiγ ∈ y by the induction hypothesis. Since (∗), (∗∗) and IB[l]  Xi(γ→δ),Xiγ ⇒
Xiδ, the fact that Xiδ ∈ z contradicts the consistency of (y, z), and hence Xiδ /∈ z. By the maximality of (y, z), we obtain
Xiδ ∈ y. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain the required fact ((y, z), i) |L δ. Conversely, suppose Xi(γ→δ) /∈ x. Then
Xi(γ→δ) ∈ w by the maximality of (x,w). Then the pair (x∪ {Xiγ }, {Xiδ}) is consistent for the following reason. If it is
2 For example, the pair ({p}, {q}) where p and q are distinct propositional variables is consistent, and the pair ({p}, {p}) is inconsistent.
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fact contradicts the consistency of (x,w). By Lemma 15, there is a maximal consistent pair (y, z) such that x∪{Xiγ } ⊆ y
and {Xiδ} ⊆ z (thus, we have Xiδ /∈ y by the consistency of (y, z)). As a consequence, we have (x,w)RL(y, z),
((y, z), i) |L γ and not [((y, z), i) |L δ] by the induction hypothesis. Therefore ((x,w), i) |L γ→δ does not hold.
• Case α ≡ γ ∧ δ. Suppose Xi(γ ∧ δ) ∈ x. Since IB[l]  Xi(γ ∧ δ) ⇒ Xiγ , the fact that Xiγ ∈ w contradicts the consistency
of (x,w), and hence Xiγ ∈ x. Similarly, we obtain Xiδ ∈ x. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain ((x,w), i) |L γ
and ((x,w), i) |L δ, and hence ((x,w), i) |L γ ∧ δ. Conversely, suppose ((x,w), i) |L γ ∧ δ, i.e., ((x,w), i) |L γ and
((x,w), i) |L δ. Then we obtain Xiγ ∈ x and Xiδ ∈ x by the induction hypothesis. Since IB[l]  Xiγ ,Xiδ ⇒ Xi(γ ∧ δ), the
fact that Xi(γ ∧ δ) ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x,w), and hence Xi(γ ∧ δ) /∈ w . By the maximality of (x,w), we
obtain Xi(γ ∧ δ) ∈ x.
• Case α ≡ γ ∨ δ. Suppose Xi(γ ∨ δ) ∈ x. Since IB[l]  Xi(γ ∨ δ) ⇒ Xiγ ∨ Xiδ, the fact that Xiγ ,Xiδ ∈ w contradicts the
consistency of (x,w), and hence Xiγ /∈ w or Xiδ /∈ w . Thus, we obtain Xiγ ∈ x or Xiδ ∈ x by the maximality of (x,w).
By the induction hypothesis, we obtain ((x,w), i) |L γ or ((x,w), i) |L δ, and hence ((x,w), i) |L γ ∨ δ. Conversely,
suppose ((x,w), i) |L γ ∨ δ, i.e., ((x,w), i) |L γ or ((x,w), i) |L δ. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain Xiγ ∈ x or
Xiδ ∈ x. Since IB[l]  Xiγ ⇒ Xi(γ ∨ δ) and IB[l]  Xiδ ⇒ Xi(γ ∨ δ), the fact that Xi(γ ∨ δ) ∈ w contradicts the consistency
of (x,w), and hence Xi(γ ∨ δ) /∈ w . By the maximality of (x,w), we obtain Xi(γ ∨ δ) ∈ x.
• Case α ≡ Xβ . XiXβ ∈ x iff Xi+1β ∈ x iff ((x,w), i + 1) |L β (by the induction hypothesis) iff ((x,w), i) |L Xβ .
• Case α ≡ Xlβ . XiXlβ ∈ x iff Xl+iβ ∈ x iff ((x,w), l + i) |L β (by the induction hypothesis) iff ((x,w), i) |L Xlβ .
• Case α ≡ Gβ .
(Subcase i < l): Suppose XiGβ ∈ x with i < l. Since IB[l]  XiGβ ⇒ Xi+kβ for any k ∈ Nl , the fact that Xi+kβ ∈ w contradicts
the consistency of (x,w), and hence Xi+kβ /∈ w . Thus, by the maximality of (x,w), we obtain Xi+kβ ∈ x for any k ∈ Nl ,
i.e., ∀ j ∈ Nl [i  j implies X jβ ∈ x]. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain ∀ j ∈ Nl [i  j implies ((x,w), j) |L β], i.e.,
((x,w), i) |L Gβ . Conversely, suppose ((x,w), i) |L Gβ , i.e., ∀ j ∈ Nl [i  j implies ((w,w), j) |L β]. By the induction
hypothesis, we obtain ∀ j ∈ Nl [i  j implies Xiβ ∈ x], i.e., ∀k ∈ Nl [Xi+kβ ∈ x]. Since IB[l]  Xiβ,Xi+1β, . . . ,Xi+lβ ⇒ XiGβ , the
fact that XiGβ ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x,w), and hence XiGβ /∈ w . Thus, we obtain XiGβ ∈ x by the maximality
of (x,w).
(Subcase i  l): Suppose XiGβ ∈ x with i  l. Since IB[l]  XiGβ ⇒ Xiβ (i  l), the fact that Xiβ ∈ w contradicts the
consistency of (x,w), and hence Xiβ /∈ w . Thus, by the maximality of (x,w), we obtain Xiβ ∈ x. By the induction hypoth-
esis, we obtain ((x,w), i) |L β , and then ((x,w), i) |L β iff ((x,w), i) |L Gβ . Conversely, suppose ((x,w), i) |L Gβ , i.e.,
((w,w), i) |L β . By the induction hypothesis, we obtain Xiβ ∈ x. Since IB[l]  Xiβ ⇒ XiGβ (i  l), the fact that XiGβ ∈ w
contradicts the consistency of (x,w), and hence XiGβ /∈ w . Thus, we obtain XiGβ ∈ x by the maximality of (x,w).
• Case α ≡ Fβ .
(Subcase i < l): Suppose XiFβ ∈ x with i < l. Since IB[l]  XiFβ ⇒ Xiβ ∨ Xi+1β ∨ · · · ∨ Xi+lβ , the fact that ∀l ∈ Nl [Xi+lβ ∈
w] contradicts the consistency of (x,w), and hence ∃k ∈ Nl [Xi+kβ /∈ w]. By the maximality of (x,w), we obtain ∃k ∈ Nl
[Xi+kβ ∈ x], i.e., ∃ j ∈ Nl [i  j and X jβ ∈ x]. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain ∃ j ∈ Nl [i  j and ((x,w), j) |L β], i.e.,
((x,w), i) |L Fβ . Conversely, suppose ((x,w), i) |L Fβ , i.e., ∃ j ∈ Nl [i  j and ((x,w), j) |L β]. By the induction hypothesis,
we obtain ∃ j ∈ Nl [i  j and X jβ ∈ x], i.e., ∃k ∈ Nl [Xi+kβ ∈ x]. Since IB[l]  Xi+kβ ⇒ XiFβ (for any k ∈ Nl), the fact that
XiFβ ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x,w), and hence XiFβ /∈ w . By the maximality of (x,w), we obtain XiFβ ∈ x.
(Subcase i  l): Suppose XiFβ ∈ x with i  l. Since IB[l]  XiFβ ⇒ Xiβ (i  l), the fact that Xiβ ∈ w contradicts the
consistency of (x,w), and hence Xiβ /∈ w . By the maximality of (x,w), we obtain Xiβ ∈ x. By the induction hypothesis, we
obtain ((x,w), i) |L β , and then ((x,w), i) |L β iff ((x,w), i) |L Fβ . Conversely, suppose ((x,w), i) |L Fβ , i.e., ((x,w), i) |L
β . By the induction hypothesis, we obtain Xiβ ∈ x. Since IB[l]  Xiβ ⇒ XiFβ (i  l), the fact that XiFβ ∈ w contradicts the
consistency of (x,w), and hence XiFβ /∈ w . By the maximality of (x,w), we obtain XiFβ ∈ x. 
Theorem 18 (Completeness). Let C be the class of all Kripke frames, L := {Γ ⇒  | IB[l]  Γ ⇒ } and L(C) := {Γ ⇒  | Γ ⇒  is
valid in all frames of C}. Then L = L(C).
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, by Theorem 13, it is suﬃcient to show that L(C) ⊆ L, i.e., for any sequent Γ ⇒ ,
if Γ ⇒  is valid in an arbitrary frame in C , then it is provable in IB[l]. To show this, we show that if Γ ⇒  is not
provable in IB[l], then there is a frame F = 〈ML,N,Nl, RL〉 ∈ C such that Γ ⇒  is not valid in F , i.e., there is a Kripke
model 〈ML,N,Nl, RL, |L〉 such that Γ ⇒  is not true in it.
Then, our goal is to show that ((u, v),0) |L Γ ⇒  does not hold in the constructed model. Here we consider only
the case Γ = ∅. We show that ((u, v),0) |L Γ ∧→∗ does not hold, i.e., ∃(x, z) ∈ ML [[(u, v)RL(x, z) and ((x, z),0) |L Γ ∧]
and [((x, z),0) |L ∗ does not hold]]. Taking (u, v) for (x, z) and 0 for i, we can verify that there is (u, v) ∈ ML such
that [(u, v)RL(u, v) and ((u, v),0) |L Γ ∧] and [((u, v),0) |L ∗ does not hold]. The ﬁrst argument is obvious because of
the reﬂexivity of RL and the fact that {Γ } ⊆ u. The second argument is shown below. The case  ≡ ∅ is obvious because
((u, v),0) |L ⊥ does not hold. The case  ≡ 〈α〉 can be proved by using Lemma 17 and the fact that α /∈ u, because we
have the fact that α /∈ u iff [((u, v),0) |L α does not hold] by Lemma 17. 
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3.1. Sequent calculus
The language of PB[l] is obtained from that of IB[l] by adding a strong negation connective ∼. The notations and conven-
tions used for PB[l] are almost the same as those for IB[l]. An expression of the form Γ ⇒ γ where γ is a single formula is
called a sequent (for PB[l]).
Deﬁnition 19. PB[l] is obtained from IB[l] by restricting each succedent of sequents to a single formula (i.e.,  used in IB[l]
is just a single formula γ ), deleting the initial sequents of the form Xi⊥ ⇒ and the structural rule (we-right), adding initial
sequents Xi∼p ⇒ Xi∼p, and adding (for any k ∈ωl) the logical inference rules of the form:
Xiα,Γ ⇒ γ
Xi∼∼α,Γ ⇒ γ (∼∼left)
Γ ⇒ Xiα
Γ ⇒ Xi∼∼α (∼∼right)
Xiα,Xi∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
Xi∼(α→β),Γ ⇒ γ (∼→left)
Γ ⇒ Xiα Γ ⇒ Xi∼β
Γ ⇒ Xi∼(α→β) (∼→right)
Xi∼α,Γ ⇒ γ Xi∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
Xi∼(α ∧ β),Γ ⇒ γ (∼∧left)
Γ ⇒ Xi∼α
Γ ⇒ Xi∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧right1)
Γ ⇒ Xi∼β
Γ ⇒ Xi∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧right2)
Xi∼α,Γ ⇒ γ
Xi∼(α ∨ β),Γ ⇒ γ (∼∨left1)
Xi∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
Xi∼(α ∨ β),Γ ⇒ γ (∼∨left2)
Γ ⇒ Xi∼α Γ ⇒ Xi∼β
Γ ⇒ Xi∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨right)
{Xi+ j∼α,Γ ⇒ γ } j∈ωl
Xi∼Gα,Γ ⇒ γ (∼Gleft)
Γ ⇒ Xi+k∼α
Γ ⇒ Xi∼Gα (∼Gright)
Xi+k∼α,Γ ⇒ γ
Xi∼Fα,Γ ⇒ γ (∼Fleft)
{Γ ⇒ Xi+ j∼α} j∈ωl
Γ ⇒ Xi∼Fα (∼Fright)
Xi∼α,Γ ⇒ γ
∼Xiα,Γ ⇒ γ (∼Xleft)
Γ ⇒ Xi∼α
Γ ⇒ ∼Xiα (∼Xright)
We use the same names for the modiﬁed single-succedent inference rules.
Note that the rules (∼Xleft) and (∼Xright) imply PB[l]  ∼Xiα ⇔ Xi∼α for any formula α. Also remark that the following
sequents are provable in cut-free PB[l]: for any formulas α and β ,
1. ∼∼α ↔ α,
2. ∼(α ∧ β) ↔ ∼α ∨ ∼β ,
3. ∼(α ∨ β) ↔ ∼α ∧ ∼β ,
4. ∼(α→β) ↔ α ∧∼β ,
5. ∼Gα ↔ F∼α,
6. ∼Fα ↔ G∼α,
7. ∼Xα ↔ X∼α.
Deﬁnition 20 (LN4). A sequent calculus LN4 for Nelson’s paraconsistent logic N4 is obtained from PB[l] by deleting the
inference rules (Xleft), (Xright), (∼Xleft), (∼Xright), (Gleft), (Gright), (Fleft), (Fright), (∼Gleft), (∼Gright), (∼Fleft), (∼Fright),
and replacing Xi by X0.
For more information on sequent calculi for N4, see, for instance, [24,33].
Deﬁnition 21. We ﬁx a countable nonempty set Φ of propositional variables and deﬁne the sets Φi := {pi | p ∈ Φ} (1 i ∈ω)
and Φ0 := Φ of propositional variables. The language LPB[l] of PB[l] is deﬁned by using Φ , →,∧,∨,∼, X,G and F. The
language LLN4 of LN4 is deﬁned by using
⋃
i∈ω Φi , →,∧,∨ and ∼.
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any i ∈ω:
1. f (Xi∼α) = f (∼Xiα) = ∼ f (Xiα).
Theorem 22 (Embedding). Let Γ be a sequence of formulas in LPB[l] , γ be a formula in LPB[l] , and f be the mapping deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 21.
1. PB[l]  Γ ⇒ γ iff LN4  f (Γ ) ⇒ f (γ ).
2. PB[l]-(cut)  Γ ⇒ γ iff LN4-(cut)  f (Γ ) ⇒ f (γ ).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6. We show only the direction (⇒) of (1) by induction on proofs P of Γ ⇒  in
PB[l]. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P and show some cases.
Case (∼Xright). The last inference of P is of the form:
Γ ⇒ Xi∼α
Γ ⇒ ∼Xiα (∼Xright)
By induction hypothesis, we have LN4  f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xi∼α), and hence obtain the required fact LN4  f (Γ ) ⇒ f (∼Xiα), since
f (Xi∼α) = f (∼Xiα) by the deﬁnition of f .
Case (∼∧right1). The last inference of P is of the form:
Γ ⇒ Xi∼α
Γ ⇒ Xi∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧right1)
By induction hypothesis, we have LN4  f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xi∼α) where f (Xi∼α) = ∼ f (Xiα) by the deﬁnition of f . Then we
obtain LN4  f (Γ ) ⇒ f (Xi∼(α ∧ β)) by:
....
f (Γ ) ⇒ ∼ f (Xiα)
f (Γ ) ⇒ ∼( f (Xiα)∧ f (Xiβ)) (∼∧right1
LN4)
where ∼( f (Xiα)∧ f (Xiβ)) = ∼( f (Xi(α ∧ β))) = f (Xi∼(α ∧ β)) by the deﬁnition of f . 
Theorem 23 (Cut-elimination). The rule (cut) is admissible in cut-free PB[l].
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7. 
Theorem 24 (Decidability). PB[l] is decidable.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 8. 
Deﬁnition 25. Let  be a negation connective. A sequent calculus L is called explosive with respect to  iff for any formulas
α and β , the sequent α, α ⇒ β is provable in L. It is called paraconsistent with respect to  iff it is not explosive with
respect to .
Proposition 26 (Paraconsistency). PB[l] is paraconsistent with respect to ∼.
Proof. Consider a sequent p,∼p ⇒ q where p and q are distinct propositional variables. Then the unprovability of this
sequent is guaranteed by using Theorem 23, i.e., we cannot construct a cut-free proof of p,∼p ⇒ q. 
3.2. Kripke semantics
The same kind of Kripke frames which is used for IB[l] is also used for PB[l]. It is known that the Kripke semantics for
logics with strong negation uses two kinds of valuations |+ (representing veriﬁcation) and |− (representing refutation).
For information on this type of semantics see, for example, [29,30,33]. Kripke models for PB[l] also use such valuations.
Deﬁnition 27. Valuations |+ and |− on a Kripke frame 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 are mappings from the set Ψ of all propositional
variables to the power set 2M×N such that for any p ∈ Ψ , any i ∈ N , and any x, y ∈ M ,
1. if (x, i) ∈ |+ (p) and xRy, then (y, i) ∈ |+ (p),
2. if (x, i) ∈ |− (p) and xRy, then (y, i) ∈ |− (p).
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from the set Φ of all formulas to 2M×N by the following clauses:
1. (x, i) |+ α→β iff ∀y ∈ M [xRy and (y, i) |+ α imply (y, i) |+ β],
2. (x, i) |+ α ∧ β iff (x, i) |+ α and (x, i) |+ β ,
3. (x, i) |+ α ∨ β iff (x, i) |+ α or (x, i) |+ β ,
4. (x, i) |+ Xα iff (x, i + 1) |+ α,
5. (x, i) |+ Xlα iff (x, l) |+ α,
6. (x, i) |+ Gα iff ∀ j ∈ Nl [i  j implies (x, j) |+ α] if i < l, and otherwise (x, l) |+ α,
7. (x, i) |+ Fα iff ∃ j ∈ Nl [i  j and (x, j) |+ α] if i < l, and otherwise (x, l) |+ α,
8. (x, i) |+ ∼α iff (x, i) |− α,
9. (x, i) |− α→β iff (x, i) |+ α and (x, i) |− β ,
10. (x, i) |− α ∧ β iff (x, i) |− α or (x, i) |− β ,
11. (x, i) |− α ∨ β iff (x, i) |− α and (x, i) |− β ,
12. (x, i) |− Xα iff (x, i + 1) |− α,
13. (x, i) |− Xlα iff (x, l) |− α,
14. (x, i) |− Gα iff ∃ j ∈ Nl [i  j and (x, j) |− α] if i < l, and otherwise (x, l) |− α,
15. (x, i) |− Fα iff ∀ j ∈ Nl [i  j implies (x, j) |− α] if i < l, and otherwise (x, l) |− α,
16. (x, i) |− ∼α iff (x, i) |+ α.
Proposition 28. Let |+ and |− be valuations on a Kripke frame 〈M,N,Nl, R〉. For any formula α, any i ∈ N, and any x, y ∈ M, (1) if
(x, i) |+ α and xRy, then (y, i) |+ α, and (2) if (x, i) |− α and xRy, then (y, i) |− α.
Deﬁnition 29. A paraconsistent Kripke model is a structure 〈M,N,Nl , R, |+, |−〉 such that (1) 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 is a Kripke
frame, and (2) |+ and |− are valuations on 〈M,N,Nl, R〉.
A formula α is true in a paraconsistent Kripke model 〈M,N,Nl, R, |+, |−〉 if (x,0) |+ α for any x ∈ M , and p-valid in
a Kripke frame 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 if it is true for any valuations |+ and |− on the Kripke frame.
A sequent Γ ⇒ γ is true in a paraconsistent Kripke model 〈M,N,Nl, R, |+, |−〉 if the formula (Γ ⇒ γ )∗ is true in the
paraconsistent Kripke model, and p-valid in a Kripke frame 〈M,N,Nl, R〉 if it is true for any valuations |+ and |− on the
Kripke frame.
We sketch the proof of the following completeness theorem for PB[l].
Theorem 30 (Completeness). Let C be the class of all Kripke frames, L := {Γ ⇒ γ | PB[l]  Γ ⇒ γ } and L(C) := {Γ ⇒ γ | Γ ⇒ γ is
p-valid in all frames of C}. Then L = L(C).
In order to prove L(C) ⊆ L, almost the same arguments as those for IB[l] will be employed, i.e., the notions of consistent
and maximal consistent pairs, and modiﬁcations of Lemmas 15 and 17 are used. In the following, only some particularly
different points will be explained.
The canonical model 〈ML,N,Nl, RL, |+L , |−L 〉 for PB[l] is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 31. Let ML be the set of all maximal consistent pairs. The binary relation RL on ML is deﬁned in the same
manner as in Deﬁnition 16. Valuations |+L (p) and |−L (p) for any propositional variable p are deﬁned by {((x,w), i) ∈
ML × N | Xi p ∈ x} and {((x,w), i) ∈ ML × N | Xi∼p ∈ x}, respectively.
Using this deﬁnition, the PB[l] version of Lemma 17 can be formalized and proved as follows.
Lemma 32. The structure 〈ML,N,Nl, RL, |+L , |−L 〉 is a paraconsistent Kripke model such that for any formula α, any i ∈ N, and any
(x,w) ∈ ML, (1) Xiα ∈ x iff ((x,w), i) |+L α, and (2) Xi∼α ∈ x iff ((x,w), i) |−L α.
Proof. Since the structure 〈ML,N,Nl, RL, |+L , |−L 〉 is a paraconsistent Kripke model, it is shown that in this model, for any
formula α, any i ∈ N , and any (x,w) ∈ ML , (1) Xiα ∈ x iff ((x,w), i) |+L α, and (2) Xi∼α ∈ x iff ((x,w), i) |−L α. This is
shown by (simultaneous) induction on the complexity of α. We show only the following critical cases.
• Case α ≡ ∼β . First we show (1). Xi∼β ∈ x iff ((x,w), i) |−L β (by the induction hypothesis for (2)) iff ((x,w), i) |+L ∼β .
Next, we show (2). Suppose Xi∼∼β ∈ x. Since PB[l]  Xi∼∼β ⇒ Xiβ , the fact that Xiβ ∈ w contradicts the consistency
of (x,w), and hence Xiβ /∈ w . By the maximality of (x,w), we obtain Xiβ ∈ x. By the induction hypothesis for (1), we
obtain ((x,w), i) |+ β , and hence ((x,w), i) |− ∼β .L L
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iff ((x,w), i) |+L Xβ . Second, we show (2). Suppose Xi∼(Xβ) ∈ x. Since PB[l]  Xi∼(Xβ) ⇒ Xi+1∼β by using (∼Xleft)
and (∼Xright), the fact that Xi+1∼β ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x,w), and hence Xi+1∼β /∈ w . By the maxi-
mality of (x,w), we obtain Xi+1∼β ∈ x. By the induction hypothesis for (2), we obtain ((x,w), i + 1) |−L β , and hence
((x,w), i) |−L Xβ . 
4. Natural deduction
This section assumes basic knowledge of Gentzen-type natural deduction systems (for detailed information, see e.g.,
[25,31]). First, we introduce a natural deduction system NPB[l] for PB[l] and show the normalization theorem for NPB[l].
Second, we discuss a natural deduction system NIB[l] for IB[l] and the normalization theorem for NIB[l]. The systems NIB[l]
and NPB[l] are deﬁned as (modiﬁed) extensions of the natural deduction system NJ for intuitionistic logic and a natural
deduction system for Nelson’s N4, respectively. A survey of natural deduction systems for N4 is presented in [14]. The
treatment of linear time in NIB[l] and NPB[l] is adopted from [16]. In [16], the strong normalization theorem for a typed
λ-calculus for the {→,∧,X,G}-fragment of IB[l] is shown, but the (strong) normalization theorem for the full system is
not discussed. There are a lot of natural deduction systems and typed-λ-calculi for LTL and its neighbors, and a survey of
such systems is also given in [3,9,16]. Note that our systems somewhat resemble Baratella’s and Masini’s system PNJ for an
intuitionistic LTL which is called a logic of positions [3].
Deﬁnition 33 (NPB[l]). The inference rules of NPB[l] are of the following form, for any k ∈ ωl := {i ∈ ω | i  l} and any
positive integer m:
[Xiα]....
Xiβ
Xi(α→β) (→I)
Xi(α→β) Xiα
Xiβ
(→E)
Xiα1 Xiα2
Xi(α1 ∧ α2)
(∧I) X
i(α1 ∧ α2)
Xiα1
(∧E1) X
i(α1 ∧ α2)
Xiα2
(∧E2)
Xiα1
Xi(α1 ∨ α2)
(∨I1) X
iα2
Xi(α1 ∨ α2)
(∨I2) Xi(α1 ∨ α2)
[Xiα1]....
β
[Xiα2]....
β
β
(∨E)
Xlα
Xl+mα
(XI) X
l+mα
Xlα
(XE)
{Xi+ jα} j∈ωl
XiGα
(GI) X
iGα
Xi+kα
(GE)
Xi+kα
XiFα
(FI) X
iFα
[Xiα]....
β
[Xi+1α]....
β · · ·
[Xi+lα]....
β
β
(FE)
Xiα
Xi∼∼α (∼I)
Xi∼∼α
Xiα
(∼E)
Xi(α ∧∼β)
Xi∼(α→β) (∼→I)
Xi∼(α→β)
Xi(α ∧ ∼β) (∼→E)
Xi(∼α ∨ ∼β)
Xi∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧I)
Xi∼(α ∧ β)
Xi(∼α ∨ ∼β) (∼∧E)
Xi(∼α ∧ ∼β)
Xi∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨I)
Xi∼(α ∨ β)
Xi(∼α ∧ ∼β) (∼∨E)
XiF∼α
Xi∼Gα (∼GI)
Xi∼Gα
XiF∼α (∼GE)
XiG∼α
Xi∼Fα (∼FI)
Xi∼Fα
XiG∼α (∼FE)
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∼Xiα (∼XI)
∼Xiα
Xi∼α (∼XE)
For the sake of simplicity, the (l + 1)-premises rule (FE) is sometimes denoted as:
XiFα
{[Xi+ jα]} j∈ωl....
β
β
(FE)
The inference rules (→I), (∧I), (∨I1), (∨I2), (XI), (GI), (FI), (∼I), (∼→I), (∼∧I), (∼∨I), (∼GI), (∼FI), and (∼XI) are
called introduction rules, and the inference rules (→E), (∧E1), (∧E2), (∨E), (XE), (GE), (FE), (∼E), (∼→E), (∼∧E), (∼∨E),
(∼GE), (∼FE), and (∼XE) are called elimination rules. The usual terminology of major and minor premises of inference rules
is used. The notions of proof (of NPB[l]), (open and discharged) assumptions of a proof, and end-formula of a proof are deﬁned
as usual. A formula α is said to be provable in NPB[l] iff there exists a proof of NPB[l] with no open assumption whose
end-formula is α. This terminology and these standard notions are from the well-known text books [25,31]. For example,
the major and minor premises of (FE) are XiFα and β , respectively, and the discharged assumptions of (FE) are the square
bracketed assumptions [Xiα], [Xi+1α], . . . , [Xi+lα].
Note that NPB[l] includes the Gentzen-type natural deduction system GN for positive intuitionistic logic. Taking 0 for i
in Xi , the rules of NPB[l] comprise the usual inference rules for GN. As a result, all the provable formulas (without temporal
operators) in GN can be proved in NPB[l]. Thus, NPB[l] is an extension and generalization of GN.
We give an example proof in NPB[l] below, where we prove the temporal induction axiom for the case l = 1.
[α ∧ G(α→Xα)]
α (∧E1)
[α ∧ G(α→Xα)]
α (∧E1)
[α ∧ G(α→Xα)]
G(α→Xα) (∧E2)
α→Xα (GE)
Xα
(→I)
Gα
(GI)
(α ∧ G(α→Xα))→Gα (→I)
Deﬁnition 34. Let α be a formula occurring in a proof D in NPB[l]. Then α is called a maximum formula in D iff α satisﬁes
the following conditions: (1) α is the conclusion of an introduction rule, (∨E) or (FE), and (2) α is the major premise of an
elimination rule. A proof is said to be normal iff it contains no maximum formula.
In order to deﬁne a reduction relation  on the set of proofs, we assume the usual deﬁnition of substitution of proofs
(for assumptions). The set of proofs is closed under substitution.
Deﬁnition 35. Let γ be a maximum formula in a proof which is the conclusion of an inference rule R . The reduction relation at γ is deﬁned as follows.
1. R is (→I), and γ is Xi(α→β):
[Xiα].... D
Xiβ
Xi(α→β) R
.... E
Xiα
Xiβ 
.... E
Xiα.... D
Xiβ
2. R is (∧I), and γ is Xi(α1 ∧ α2):
.... D1
Xiα1
.... D2
Xiα2
Xi(α1 ∧ α2)
R
Xiαn 
.... Dn
Xiαn
where n is 1 or 2.
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.... D
Xiαn
Xi(α1 ∨ α2)
R
[Xiα1].... E1
Xiβ
[Xiα2].... E2
Xiβ
Xiβ 
.... D
Xiαn.... En
Xiβ
where n is 1 or 2.
4. R is (∨E):
.... D1
Xi(α1 ∨ α2)
[Xiα1].... D2
Xiγ
[Xiα2].... D3
Xiγ
Xiγ
R
E1 · · · El
Xiβ
R ′

.... D1
Xi(α1 ∨ α2)
[Xiα1].... D2
Xiγ E1 · · · El
Xiβ
R ′
[Xiα2].... D3
Xiγ E1 · · · El
Xiβ
R ′
Xiβ
R
where R ′ is an arbitrary inference rule, and both E1, . . . , El are proofs of the minor premises of R ′ if they exist.
5. R is (XI), and γ is Xl+mα:
.... D
Xlα
Xl+mα
R
Xlα 
.... D
Xlα
6. R is (GI), and γ is XiGα:
.... D j
{Xi+ jα} j∈ωl
XiGα
R
Xi+kα 
.... Dk
Xi+kα
7. R is (FI), and γ is XiFα:
.... Dk
Xi+kα
XiFα
R
{[Xi+ jα]} j∈ωl.... E j
Xiβ
Xiβ 
.... Dk
Xi+kα.... Ek
Xiβ
8. R is (FE):
.... D
XiFα
{[Xi+ jα]} j∈ωl.... D j
Xiγ
Xiγ
R
E1 · · · El
Xiβ
R ′

.... D
XiFα
{[Xi+ jα]} j∈ωl.... D j
Xiγ E1 · · · El
Xiβ
R ′
Xiβ
R
where R ′ is an arbitrary inference rule, and both E1, . . . , El are proofs of the minor premises of R ′ if they exist.
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.... D
Xiα
Xi∼∼α R
Xiα 
.... D
Xiα
10. R is (∼→I), and γ is Xi∼(α→β):
.... D
Xi(α ∧ ∼β)
Xi∼(α→β) R
Xi(α ∧ ∼β) 
.... D
Xi(α ∧∼β)
11. R is (∼∧I), and γ is Xi∼(α ∧ β):
.... D
Xi(∼α ∨ ∼β)
Xi∼(α ∧ β) R
Xi(∼α ∨ ∼β) 
.... D
Xi(∼α ∨ ∼β)
12. R is (∼∨I), and γ is Xi∼(α ∨ β):
.... D
Xi(∼α ∧ ∼β)
Xi∼(α ∨ β) R
Xi(∼α ∧ ∼β) 
.... D
Xi(∼α ∧ ∼β)
13. R is (∼GI), and γ is Xi∼Gα:
.... D
XiF∼α
Xi∼Gα R
XiF∼α 
.... D
XiF∼α
14. R is (∼FI), and γ is Xi∼Fα:
.... D
XiG∼α
Xi∼Fα R
XiG∼α 
.... D
XiG∼α
15. R is (∼XI), and γ is ∼Xiα:
.... D
Xi∼α
∼Xiα R
Xi∼α 
.... D
Xi∼α
16. Let D, D ′, E, F , D j ( j ∈ωl) be proofs. If D  D ′ , then
D
α (I)  D
′
α (I)
D E
α (R)  D
′ E
α (R)
E D
α (R)  E D
′
α (R)
D E F
α (∨E)  D
′ E F
α (∨E)
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α (∨E)  E D
′ F
α (∨E)
E F D
α (∨E)  E F D
′
α (∨E)
D0 · · · D · · · Dl
α (GI)  D0 · · · D
′ · · · Dl
α (GI)
D0 · · · D · · · Dl+1
α (FE)  D0 · · · D
′ · · · Dl+1
α (FE)
where I ∈ {→I,∧E1,∧E2,∨I1,∨I2,XI,XE,GE, FI ∼I,∼E,∼→I,∼→E,∼∧I,∼∧E,∼∨I,∼∨E,∼GI,∼GE,∼FI,∼FE,
∼XI,∼XE}, R ∈ {→E,∧I} and D0, . . . , Dl+1 can be D or D ′ .
Deﬁnition 36. If D ′ is obtained from D by the reduction at γ , then such a fact is denoted by D D ′ . A sequence D0, D1, . . .
of proofs is called a reduction sequence iff it satisﬁes the following conditions: (1) Di  Di+1 for all i  0 and (2) the last
proof in the sequence is normal iff the sequence is ﬁnite. A proof D is called normalizable iff there is a ﬁnite reduction
sequence starting from D .
Let P be a proof. The expression oa(P ) denotes the set of open assumptions of P , and the expression end(P ) denotes
the end-formula of P .
From the following theorem, we can obtain the fact that a formula α is provable in NPB[l] if and only if the sequent
⇒ α is provable in PB[l].
Theorem 37 (Equivalence between NPB[l] and PB[l]). We have the following.
1. If P is a proof in NPB[l] such that oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {β}, then the sequent Γ ⇒ β is provable in PB[l].
2. If a sequent Γ ⇒ β is provable in PB[l]-(cut), then there is a proof Q in NPB[l] which satisﬁes the following conditions:
(a) oa(Q ) = Γ , (b) end(Q ) = {β}, and (c) Q is normal.
Proof. First, we show (1) by induction on a proof P of PB[l] such that oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {β}. We distinguish the
cases according to the last inference of P . We show some cases.
Case (GI): P is of the form:
Γ.... P
′
{Xi+ jα} j∈ωl
XiGα
(GI)
where oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {XiGα}. By the hypothesis of induction, the sequents Γ j ⇒ Xi+ jα for any j ∈ ωl where Γ j
is a subset of Γ are provable in PB[l]. Then the sequent Γ ⇒ XiGα is provable in PB[l] by using (we-left) and (Gright).
Case (FE): P is of the form:
Γl+1....
XiFα
Γ0[Xiα]....
γ
Γ1[Xi+1α]....
γ · · ·
Γl[Xi+lα]....
γ
γ (FE)
where oa(P ) = Γ =⋃ j∈ωl+1 Γ j and end(P ) = {γ }. By the hypothesis of induction, the following sequents are provable in
PB[l]: (Γl+1 ⇒ XiFα), (Xiα,Γ0 ⇒ γ ), (Xi+1α,Γ1 ⇒ γ ), . . . , (Xi+lα,Γl ⇒ γ ). Then we obtain the required fact:
Γl+1 ⇒ XiFα.... (we-left)
Γ ⇒ XiFα
Xiα,Γ0 ⇒ γ.... (we-left)
Xiα,Γ ⇒ γ
Xi+1α,Γ1 ⇒ γ.... (we-left)
Xi+1α,Γ ⇒ γ · · ·
Xi+lα,Γl ⇒ γ.... (we-left)
Xi+lα,Γ ⇒ γ
XiFα,Γ ⇒ γ (Fleft)
Γ,Γ ⇒ γ (cut)
.... (co)
Γ ⇒ γ
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Γ.... P
′
Xi(α ∧∼γ )
Xi∼(α→γ ) (∼→I)
where oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {Xi∼(α→γ )}. By the hypothesis of induction, the sequent Γ ⇒ Xi(α ∧ ∼γ ) is provable in
PB[l]. Then the sequent Γ ⇒ Xi∼(α→γ ) is provable in PB[l] as follows.
....
Γ ⇒ Xi(α ∧∼γ )
Xiα ⇒ Xiα
Xiα,Xi∼γ ⇒ Xiα (we-left)
Xi∼γ ⇒ Xi∼γ
Xiα,Xi∼γ ⇒ Xi∼γ (we-left)
Xiα,Xi∼γ ⇒ Xi∼(α→γ ) (∼→right).... (∧left1,2), (co)
Xi(α ∧ ∼γ ) ⇒ Xi∼(α→γ )
Γ ⇒ Xi∼(α→γ ) (cut)
Second, we prove (2) by induction on a cut-free proof P of Γ ⇒ β in PB[l]-(cut). We distinguish the cases according to
the inference of P . We show some cases.
Case (Gleft): P is of the form:
Xi+kα,Γ ⇒ γ
XiGα,Γ ⇒ γ (Gleft)
By the hypothesis of induction, there is a normal proof Q ′ in NPB[l] of the form:
Γ,Xi+kα.... Q
′
γ
where oa(Q ′) = Γ ∪ {Xi+kα} and end(Q ′) = {γ }. Then we obtain a normal proof Q as follows.
Γ
XiGα
Xi+kα
(GE)
.... Q
′
γ
where oa(Q ) = Γ ∪ {XiGα} and end(Q ) = {γ }.
Case (Fleft): P is of the form:
{Xi+ jα,Γ ⇒ γ } j∈ωl
XiFα,Γ ⇒ γ (Fleft)
By the hypothesis of induction, there are normal proofs {Q j} j∈ωl in NPB[l] of the form: for any j ∈ωl ,
Γ,Xi+ jα.... Q j
γ
where oa(Q j) = Γ ∪ {Xi+ jα} and end(Q j) = {γ }. Then we obtain a normal proof Q as follows:
XiFα
Γ [Xiα].... Q 0
γ · · ·
Γ [Xi+lα].... Ql
γ
γ (FE)
where oa(Q ) = Γ ∪ {XiFα} and end(Q ) = {γ }.
Case (∼→right): P is of the form:
.... P1
Γ ⇒ Xiα
.... P2
Γ ⇒ Xi∼γ
Γ ⇒ Xi∼(α→γ ) (∼→right)
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Γ.... Q 1
Xiα,
Γ.... Q 2
Xi∼γ
where oa(Q 1) = oa(Q 2) = Γ , end(Q 1) = {Xiα} and end(Q 2) = {Xi∼γ }. Then we obtain a normal proof Q as follows.
Γ.... Q 1
Xiα
Γ.... Q 2
Xi∼γ
Xi(α ∧ ∼γ ) (∧I)
Xi∼(α→γ ) (∼→I)
where oa(Q ) = Γ and end(Q ) = {Xi∼(α→γ )}. 
Theorem 38 (Normalization for NPB[l]). All proofs in NPB[l] are normalizable. More precisely, if a proof P in NPB[l] is given, then
there is a normal proof Q such that oa(Q ) = oa(P ) and end(Q ) = end(P ).
Proof. Suppose oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {β}. By Theorem 37(1), the sequent Γ ⇒ β is provable in PB[l]. By Theorem 23,
the sequent Γ ⇒ β is also provable in PB[l]-(cut). Then, by Theorem 37(2), there is a normal proof Q in NPB[l] such that
oa(Q ) = oa(P ) and end(Q ) = end(P ). 
Next, we discuss NIB[l]. The proof of the equivalence and normalization theorems are omitted.
Deﬁnition 39 (NIB[l]). NIB[l] is obtained from NPB[l] by deleting the inference rules concerning ∼ and adding the inference
rule of the form:
Xi⊥
α (⊥E)
The notions of proof, reduction, etc. are deﬁned similarly as for NPB[l].
Theorem 40 (Equivalence between NIB[l] and IB[l]). We have the following.
1. If P is a proof in NIB[l] such that oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {β}, then the sequent Γ ⇒ β is provable in IB[l].
2. If a sequent Γ ⇒ β is provable in IB[l]-(cut), then there is a proof Q inNIB[l]which satisﬁes the following conditions: (a) oa(Q ) =
Γ , (b) end(Q ) = {β}, and (c) Q is normal.
Theorem 41 (Normalization for NIB[l]). All proofs in NIB[l] are normalizable. More precisely, if a proof P in NIB[l] is given, then there
is a normal proof Q such that oa(Q ) = oa(P ) and end(Q ) = end(P ).
5. Display calculi
5.1. A display calculus for IB[l]
In this subsection, we present a display sequent calculus δIB[l] for IB[l]. In comparison to the sequent calculus from
Section 2, δIB[l] has some advantages from a philosophical point of view, see also [4,11,35]. In particular, if the introduction
rules of a sequent calculus are viewed as meaning assignments, then the sequent calculus from Section 2 is holistic in the
sense that it assigns a meaning to the operators Xi only in combination with each of the other object language connectives.
By suitably generalizing the notion of a sequent and exploiting the fact that (i) ∧ and →, (ii) G and P (“sometimes in
the past”), (iii) H (“always in the past”) and F, and (iv) Xi and Ei (“i steps earlier”) form residuated pairs, it is possible
to state introduction rules for the connectives in such a way that every operation is introduced as the main connective of
a single-antecedent (single-succedent) conclusion sequent. Moreover, the right and left introduction rules exhibit only one
occurrence of the operation and no occurrence of another connective from the object language. Furthermore, the interpre-
tation of some structural connectives in the display calculus as backward-looking temporal operators in either antecedent
or succedent position allows one to add introduction rules with the just mentioned property also for the backward-looking
modalities. Certain properties of the assumed temporal order such as the boundedness of the time domain can then be
expressed by purely structural sequent rules not exhibiting any operations of the logical object language.
In ordinary sequent calculi, the comma, ‘,’, may be seen as a context-sensitive structural connective. It is to be understood
as conjunction in antecedent position and as disjunction in succedent position of a sequent. In δIB[l] we shall use one binary
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and Γ are structures (or ‘Gentzen terms’). We assume the empty structure I, and the set of structures is inductively deﬁned
from a set Atom of atomic formulas as follows:
formulas: α ∈ Form(Atom)
structures  ∈ Struc(Form)
 ::= A | I | (;) |  |  | |
In antecedent position, ; is to be interpreted as conjunction and in succedent position as implication. In antecedent position,
 is to be read as P and in succedent position as G, wheres  is to be understood as F in antecedent position and as H
in succedent position. The structure i for any i ∈ ω is inductively deﬁned by (0 := ) and (n+1 := n  ).
Similarly, (0 := ) and (n+1 :=n ). In succedent position i means Ei and in antecedent position it means Xi .
In succedent position i means Xi and in antecedent position it means Ei .
The suggested interpretation of the structural connectives justiﬁes a number of ‘display postulates’ (dp) (we omit outer
brackets)3:
Γ ⇒ ;Σ
;Γ ⇒ Σ
 ⇒ Γ ;Σ
 ⇒ Γ ;Σ
;Γ ⇒ Σ
Γ ⇒ ;Σ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ

i ⇒ Γ
 ⇒iΓ
 ⇒iΓ

i ⇒ Γ

i ⇒ Γ
 ⇒iΓ
 ⇒iΓ

i ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒i i Γ
 ⇒i i Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒i i Γ
 ⇒i i Γ
 ⇒ Γ
Moreover, we assume initial sequents p ⇒ p, a cut-rule:
 ⇒ α α ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ (cut)
rules which govern the empty structure:
; I⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
I; ⇒ Γ
I; ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
; I⇒ Γ
and versions of the standard left structural rules from ordinary Gentzen calculi, weakening, exchange, and contraction,
together with associativity:
 ⇒ Γ
;Σ ⇒ Γ (lm)
;Σ ⇒ Γ
Σ; ⇒ Γ (le)
; ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ (lc)
(;Γ );Σ ⇒ Θ
; (Γ ;Σ) ⇒ Θ (la)
We also assume further structural rules, for any k ∈ ωl , to express the boundedness of the temporal order (rules (b), (b′)),
to capture the interaction between the temporal operators (rules (lg)–(r f )), and to capture part of the interaction between
Xi and → (rule ):
 ⇒iΓ ;iΣ
 ⇒i(Γ ;Σ) 
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒l+m l Γ (b)
 ⇒ Γ

l+m

l  ⇒ Γ (b
′)
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒i i+k Γ (lg)
{ ⇒i+ jΓ } j ∈ωl
i  ⇒ Γ (rg)
{i+ j ⇒ Γ } j ∈ωl
 ⇒ i Γ (lf )
 ⇒ Γ

i

i+k  ⇒ Γ (rf )
Deﬁnition 42. The display sequent calculus δIB[l] consists of the above sequent rules together with the following right and
left introduction rules4:
3 Note that the following display postulates are derivable:
 ⇒ Γ

i

i  ⇒ Γ

i

i  ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ

i

i  ⇒ Γ

i

i  ⇒ Γ
 ⇒ Γ
4 We use the same names for the logical inference rules as in the standard-style IB[l].
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 ⇒ α Γ ⇒ β
;Γ ⇒ (α ∧ β) (∧right)
α;β ⇒ 
(α ∧ β) ⇒  (∧left)
 ⇒ α
 ⇒ (α ∨ β)
 ⇒ β
 ⇒ (α ∨ β) (∨right)
α ⇒  β ⇒ 
(α ∨ β) ⇒  (∨left)
 ⇒ α;β
 ⇒ (α → β) (→ right)
 ⇒ α β ⇒ Γ
(α → β) ⇒ ;Γ (→ left)
 ⇒ α
 ⇒ Gα (Gright)
α ⇒ 
Gα ⇒  (Gleft)
 ⇒ α
 ⇒ Fα (Fright)
α ⇒ 
Fα ⇒  (Fleft)

i ⇒ α
 ⇒ Xiα (X
iright)
α ⇒i
Xiα ⇒  (X
i left)
Proposition 43. In δIB[l], α ⇒ α is provable for every formula α.
Proof. By induction on α. 
We take up the earlier example of a natural deduction proof and present a proof in δIB[l] of the temporal induction
axiom for the case l = 1. We ﬁrst present a proof Π1 of G(α → Xα) ⇒ X(α → Xα).
α → Xα ⇒ α → Xα
G(α → Xα) ⇒ (α → Xα)
G(α → Xα) ⇒(α → Xα) (lg)
G(α → Xα) ⇒ α → Xα
G(α → Xα) ⇒ X(α → Xα)
Next, we give a proof Π2 of α;X(α→Xα) ⇒ Xα.
α ⇒ α Xα ⇒ Xα
α→Xα ⇒ α;Xα
α→Xα ⇒(α;Xα) (b)
X(α→Xα) ⇒ (α;Xα)
X(α→Xα) ⇒ α;Xα
α;X(α→Xα) ⇒ Xα
We combine Π1 and Π2 to obtain a proof Π3 of α ∧ G(α → Xα) ⇒ Xα.
Π1
α ⇒ α X(α → Xα) ⇒ X(α → Xα)
α;X(α → Xα) ⇒ α ∧ X(α → Xα)
Π2
α ∧ X(α → Xα) ⇒ Xα
α;X(α → Xα)) ⇒ Xα
X(α → Xα) ⇒ α;Xα
G(α → Xα) ⇒ α;Xα
α;G(α → Xα) ⇒ Xα
α ∧ G(α → Xα) ⇒ Xα
We can now use Π3 in a proof of the induction axiom (for the case l = 1).
α ⇒ α
α;G(α→Xα) ⇒ α
α ∧ G(α→Xα) ⇒ α
Π3
α ⇒ α
α ⇒ α
Xα ⇒α
α ∧ G(α→Xα) ⇒α
(α ∧ G(α→Xα)) ⇒ α (rg)
α ∧ G(α→Xα) ⇒ Gα
If two sequents are interderivable by means of the display postulates, the sequents are said to be display equivalent. In
display logic, any substructure of a given sequent s may be displayed as either the entire antecedent or the entire succedent
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succedent parts of a sequent. A succedent part of a sequent  ⇒ Γ is a certain occurrence of a substructure of Γ . Suppose
Σ occurs as a substructure of Γ . Then this occurrence of Σ is said to be a succedent part of the sequent  ⇒ Γ iff
1. Γ ≡ Σ , or
2. Γ ≡ Γ1;Γ2 and Σ is a succedent part of ;Γ1 ⇒ Γ2, or
3. Γ ≡ Γ1, and Σ is a succedent part of  ⇒ Γ1,  ∈ {,,i,i}.
An antecedent part of s ≡  ⇒ Γ is either an occurrence of a substructure of  or an occurrence of a substructure of Γ
that is not a succedent part of s.
Theorem 44 (Display property for δIB[l]). (See Belnap [4].) For every sequent s and every antecedent part (succedent part) of s there
exists a sequent s′ display equivalent to s such that  is the entire antecedent (succedent) of s′ .5
Theorem 45 (Cut-elimination for δIB[l]). (See Belnap [4].) Every proof of a sequent  ⇒ Γ in δIB[l], can be converted into a cut-free
proof of  ⇒ Γ in δIB[l].
Proof. This follows from Belnap’s cut–elimination theorem for properly displayable logics. The calculus δIB[l] satisﬁes Bel-
nap’s conditions (C1)–(C8) and hence is properly displayable. 
The context-sensitive reading of the structural connectives is made explicit by the following translation from sequents
into formulas, where  is deﬁned as α → α for some ﬁxed atomic formula α.
Deﬁnition 46. If  ⇒ Γ is a sequent then its translation τ ( ⇒ Γ ) is the formula τ1() → τ2(Γ ), where the translations
τ1 and τ2 from structures into formulas are inductively deﬁnes as follows:
(1) If Σ is a formula α, then τ1(Σ) ≡ τ2(Σ) := α.
(2) If Σ ≡ I, then τ1(Σ) := ; τ2(Σ) := ⊥.
(3) τ1(Σ;Θ) := τ1(Σ)∧ τ1(Θ); τ2(Σ;Θ) := τ1(Σ) → τ2(Θ).
(4) τ1(Σ) := Pτ1(Σ); τ2(Σ) := Gτ2(Σ).
(5) τ1(Σ) := Hτ1(Σ); τ2(Σ) := Fτ2(Σ).
(6) τ1(iΣ) := Xiτ1(Σ); τ2(iΣ) := Eiτ2(Σ).
(7) τ1(iΣ) := Eiτ1(Σ); τ2(iΣ) := Xiτ2(Σ).
Theorem 47 (Soundness of δIB[l]). If δIB[l]   ⇒ Γ , then τ ( ⇒ Γ ) is valid in the class of all Kripke frames.
Proof. The evaluation conditions for formulas Eα are: (x, i) | Eα iff (x, i − 1) | α if i > 0 and otherwise (x,0) | α. For
formulas Pα we have: (x, i) | Pα iff ∃ j ∈ Nl [ j  i and (x, j) | α] if i > 0 and otherwise (x,0) | α. By induction on proofs
in δIB[l], it can be shown that if δIB[l]   ⇒ Γ , then for every Kripke frame and valuation |, τ ( ⇒ Γ ) is true at every
state x and every moment i. Thus, ∀x (x,0) | τ ( ⇒ Γ ). 
If  ≡ 〈α1,α2, . . . ,αn〉 (1 n), let ∧ and ∨ stand for α1 ∧ α2 ∧ · · · ∧ αn and α1 ∨ α2 ∨ · · · ∨ αn , respectively. If  is
the empty sequence, let ∧ and ∨ stand for  and ⊥, respectively.
Theorem48 (Completeness of δIB[l]). If the sequent ⇒ Γ is provable in the sequent calculus for IB[l] from Section 2, then∧ ⇒ Γ ∨
is provable in δIB[l].
Proof. By induction on proofs in the standard sequent system for IB[l].
Initial sequents: By Proposition 43 and
⊥ ⇒i⊥
Xi⊥ ⇒ ⊥
5 An elegant method for proving the display property can be found in [28].
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Γ∧ ⇒ α
α ⇒ α Σ∧ ⇒ Σ∧
α;Σ∧ ⇒ α ∧Σ∧ α ∧Σ∧ ⇒ ∨
α;Σ∧ ⇒ ∨
α ⇒ Σ∧;∨
α ⇒ Σ∧ → ∨
Γ ∧ ⇒ Σ∧ → ∨
Σ∧ ⇒ Σ ∧ ∨ ⇒ ∨
Σ∧ → ∨ ⇒ Σ∧;∨
Γ ∧ ⇒ Σ∧;∨
Γ ∧;Σ∧ ⇒ ∨
Γ ∧ ∧Σ∧ ⇒ ∨
(→left): By the induction hypothesis, the sequents Γ ∧ ⇒ Xiα and Xiβ ∧ Σ∧ ⇒ ∨ are provable in δIB[l]. If Xi(α → β)
⇒ Xiα → Xiβ is probable in δIB[l], we can proceed as follows:
Xi(α → β) ⇒ Xiα → Xiβ
Γ ∧ ⇒ Xiα
Xiβ ⇒ Xiβ Σ∧ ⇒ Σ∧
Xiβ;Σ∧ ⇒ Xiβ ∧Σ∧ Xiβ ∧Σ∧ ⇒ ∨
Xiβ;Σ∧ ⇒ ∨
Xiβ ⇒ Σ∧;∨
Xiα → Xiβ ⇒ Γ ∧; (Σ∧;∨)
Xi(α → β) ⇒ Γ ∧; (Σ∧;∨)
.
.
.
Xi(α → β)∧ Γ ∧ ∧Σ∧ ⇒ ∨
Thus, it remains to show that Xi(α → β) ⇒ Xiα → Xiβ is probable in δIB[l]. To this end we will combine the following four
proofs, Π1–Π4.
Π1:
α → β ⇒ α → β
α → β ⇒i i (α → β)
Xi(α → β) ⇒i(α → β)
Xi(α → β);Xiα ⇒i(α → β)

i(Xi(α → β);Xiα) ⇒ (α → β)
Π2:
α ⇒ α
α ⇒i i α
Xiα ⇒i(α → β)
Xi(α → β);Xiα ⇒iα

i(Xi(α → β);Xiα) ⇒ α
Π3:
Π1 Π2

i(Xi(α → β);Xiα);i(Xi(α → β);Xiα) ⇒ (α → β)∧ α

i(Xi(α → β);Xiα) ⇒ (α → β)∧ α
Xi(α → β);Xiα ⇒i((α → β)∧ α)
Π4:
α ⇒ α β ⇒ β
α → β ⇒ α;β
(α → β);α ⇒ β
(α → β)∧ α ⇒ β
(α → β)∧ α ⇒i i β

i((α → β)∧ α) ⇒iβ
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Π3 Π4
(Xi(α → β);Xiα) ⇒iβ

i(Xi(α → β);Xiα) ⇒ β
(Xi(α → β);Xiα) ⇒ Xiβ
Xi(α → β) ⇒ Xiα;Xiβ
Xi(α → β) ⇒ Xiα → Xiβ
(→right): Here the essential step is to show that Xiα → Xiβ ⇒ Xi(α → β) is probable in δIB[l]. We use the structural
sequent rule :
α ⇒ α

i

i α → α

iα → Xiα
β ⇒ β
β ⇒i i β
Xiβ ⇒iα
Xiα → Xiβ ⇒iα;iβ
Xiα → Xiβ ⇒i(α;β) 

i(Xiα → Xiβ) ⇒ α;β

i(Xiα → Xiβ) ⇒ α → β
Xiα → Xiβ ⇒ Xi(α → β)
(∧left1,2): The proof uses (cut), (lm), and the provability of iγ ⇒ Xiγ .
(∧right): The proof uses (cut), (lc), and the provability of Xiγ ⇒iγ .
(∨left): The proof uses (cut) and the provability of iγ ⇒ Xiγ .
(∨right1,2): The proof makes use of (cut) and the provability of Xiγ ⇒iγ .
(Xleft): The proof makes use of (cut) and the provability of Xl+mγ ⇒ Xlγ by means of the boundedness rule (b).
(Xright): We may use (cut) and the provability of Xlγ ⇒ Xl+mγ by means of the boundedness rule (b′).
(Gleft): The proof makes use of (cut) and the following subproof:
α ⇒ α
Gα ⇒ α
Gα ⇒i i+k α (lg)
.
.
.
(dp)
Gα ⇒iXi+kα
XiGα ⇒ Xi+kα
(Gright):
{Γ ∧ ⇒i+ jα} j ∈ωl
i Γ ∧ ⇒ α (rg)

iΓ ∧ ⇒ Gα
Γ ∧ ⇒ XiGα
(Fleft):
{i+ jα ⇒ Γ ∧;∨} j ∈ωl
α ⇒ i (Γ ∧;∨) (lf )
Fα ⇒i(Γ ∧;∨)
XiFα ⇒ Γ ∧;∨
XiFα;Γ ∧ ⇒ ∨
XiFα ∧ Γ ∧ ⇒ ∨
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Γ ∧ ⇒ Xi+kα
α ⇒ α
α ⇒ Fα

i

i+k α ⇒ Fα (rf )

i+kα ⇒ XiFα
α ⇒i+kXiFα
Xi+kα ⇒ XiFα
Γ ∧ ⇒ XiFα 
Due to the presence of both the forward-looking and the backward-looking structural connectives, introduction rules for
the backward-looking counterparts of IB[l]’s temporal operators are easily available:
 ⇒ α
 ⇒ Hα (Hright)
α ⇒ 
Hα ⇒  (Hleft)
 ⇒ α
 ⇒ Pα (Pright)
α ⇒ 
Pα ⇒  (Pleft)

i ⇒ α
 ⇒ Eiα (E
iright)
α ⇒i
Eiα ⇒  (E
i left)
5.2. A display calculus for PB[l]
A sound and complete display calculus δPB[l] for PB[l] can be obtained in a natural and straightforward way, see also
the display calculi presented in [36] for extensions of Heyting–Brouwer logic by strong negation. Again, the inferential
understanding of Xi as laid down by the introduction rules is (basically) non-holistic. It is only the meaning of ∼ that is
speciﬁed in combination with each of the other object language connectives.
Deﬁnition 49. The display calculus δPB[l] is obtained from δIB[l] by removing (⊥left) and adding initial sequents ∼p ⇒ ∼p
together with the following sequent rules:
 ⇒ ∼α
 ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β)
 ⇒ ∼β
 ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧right)
∼α ⇒  ∼β ⇒ 
∼(α ∧ β) ⇒  (∼∧left)
 ⇒ ∼α Γ ⇒ ∼β
;Γ ⇒ ∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨right)
∼α;∼β ⇒ 
∼(α ∨ β) ⇒  (∼∨left)
 ⇒ α Γ ⇒ ∼β
;Γ ⇒ ∼(α → β) (∼→right)
α;∼β ⇒ 
∼(α → β) ⇒  (∼→left)
 ⇒ ∼α
 ⇒ ∼Gα (∼Gright)
∼α ⇒ 
∼Gα ⇒  (∼Gleft)
 ⇒ ∼α
 ⇒ ∼Fα (∼Fright)
∼α ⇒ 
∼Fα ⇒  (∼Fleft)
 ⇒i∼α
 ⇒ ∼Xiα (∼X
iright)

i∼α ⇒ 
∼Xiα ⇒  (∼X
i left)
Note that for every formula α, the sequent α ⇒ α is provable in δPB[l]. Moreover, the modiﬁcations leading from δIB[l]
to δPB[l] clearly do not spoil the display property.
Theorem 50 (Display property for δPB[l]). For every sequent s and every antecedent part (succedent part) of s, there exists a sequent
s′ display equivalent to s such that  is the entire antecedent (succedent) of s′ .
Theorem 51 (Soundness of δPB[l]). If δPB[l]   ⇒ Γ , then τ ( ⇒ Γ ) is p-valid in the class of all Kripke models for δPB[l].
Proof. The veriﬁcation conditions for formulas Pα and Eα are analogous to the intuitionistic case. The refutation conditions
are: (x, i) |− Eα iff (x, i − 1) |− α if i > 0 and otherwise (x,0) |− α; (x, i) |− Pα iff ∃ j ∈ Nl [ j  i and (x, j) |− α] if
i > 0 and otherwise (x,0) |− α. By induction on proofs in δPB[l], it can be shown that if δPB[l]   ⇒ , then for every
Kripke frame and valuations |+ and |− , (x, i) |+ τ ( ⇒ Γ ) for every state x and moment i. 
Theorem 52 (Completeness of δPB[l]). If the sequent ⇒ γ is provable in the sequent calculus for PB[l] from Section 3, then∧ ⇒ γ
is provable in δPB[l].
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(∼Gleft): By the induction hypothesis, for every j ∈ ωl , Xi+ j∼α ∧ Γ ∧ ⇒ γ is provable. It can easily be shown that

i+ j∼α ⇒ ∧Γ ∧;γ is provable, for every j ∈ωl . Then we have the following proof:
{i+ j∼α ⇒ ∧Γ ∧;γ } j ∈ωl
∼α ⇒ i (Γ ∧;γ ) (lf )
∼Gα ⇒i(Γ ∧;γ )
Xi∼Gα ⇒ Γ ∧;γ
.
.
.
Xi∼Gα ∧ Γ ∧ ⇒ γ
(∼Gright): We may use (cut) and the following proof:
∼α ⇒ ∼α
∼α ⇒ ∼Gα
∼α ⇒ ∼Gα
∼α ⇒i+k i+k ∼Gα (lg)
.
.
.
(dp)
Xi+k∼α ⇒ Xi∼Gα
(∼Fleft): Use (lg). (∼Fleft): Use (rg). (∼Xleft); (∼Xright): We may use the rules (∼Xiright) and (∼Xi left). 
Note that one may describe a so-called ‘full circle’ through the different proof systems for IB[l] and PB[l] to show their
mutual equivalence.
The proof of Belnap’s [4] general cut–elimination theorem cannot be applied to δPB[l], because δPB[l] fails to satisfy
his condition (C1). This condition guarantees the subformula-property as a corollary of cut–elimination and says that each
formula which is a constituent of some premise of a sequent rule is a subformula of the conclusion sequent. The calculus
δPB[l] satisﬁes, however, a negation normal form theorem. The provability of the following sequents:
∼∼α ⇔ α
∼(α ∧ β) ⇔ ∼α ∨ ∼β
∼(α ∨ β) ⇔ ∼α ∧ ∼β
∼(α → β) ⇔ α ∧∼β
∼Gα ⇔ F∼α
∼Fα ⇔ G∼α
∼Xiα ⇔ Xi∼α
induces the deﬁnition of a function nnf on the set of LPB[l]-formulas such that for every LPB[l]-formula α, nnf (α) is a
formula containing ∼ at most in front of atomic formulas.6
Proposition 53. For every α ∈LPB[l] , δPB[l]  α ⇒ nnf (α) and δPB[l]  nnf (α) ⇒ α.
Proof. By induction on α. 
If s is a sequent, let (s)′ be the result of replacing every LPB[l]-formula α in s by nnf (α). If δPB[l] is restricted to formulas
in negation normal form, Belnap’s proof can be applied.
Theorem 54. If δPB[l]   ⇒ Γ , then there is a cut-free proof of ( ⇒ Γ )′ in δPB[l].
Introduction rules for the strong negation of formulas Pα, Hα, and Eiα are readily available:
6 Note, however, that the Replacement Theorem does not hold for PB[l]. Although ∼(α → β) and (α ∧ ∼β) are provably equivalent, (α → β) and
∼(α ∧ ∼β) are not.
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 ⇒ ∼Hα (∼Hright)
∼α ⇒ 
∼Hα ⇒  (∼Hleft)
 ⇒ ∼α
 ⇒ ∼Pα (∼Pright)
∼α ⇒ 
∼Pα ⇒  (∼Pleft)

i ⇒ ∼α
 ⇒ ∼Eiα (∼E
iright)
∼α ⇒i
∼Eiα ⇒  ∼(E
i left)
6. Remarks on the inﬁnite linear time domain
In this section, we suggest to construct some inﬁnite time domain versions of the proposed systems. Inﬁnite (unbounded)
versions of IB[l] and PB[l] can naturally be considered. Let IB[ω] and PB[ω] be obtained from IB[l] and PB[l], respectively,
by deleting (Xleft) and (Xright), and replacing ωl by ω. Embedding theorems of IB[ω] and PB[ω] into inﬁnitary intuitionis-
tic logic (see [13]) and inﬁnitary Nelson’s paraconsistent logic, respectively, can be obtained, and then the cut–elimination
theorems for IB[ω] and PB[ω] may also be obtained using these embedding theorems. Also, normalizable natural deduc-
tion systems NIB[ω] and NPB[ω] can be obtained. Unbounded display calculi δIB[ω] and δPB[ω] can be deﬁned from δIB[l]
and δPB[l], respectively, by deleting the boundedness rules (b) and (b′), and replacing ωl by ω. However, the Kripke com-
pleteness theorems for these systems may not be shown for the natural Kripke semantics with the following valuation
conditions:
(x, i) | Xα iff (x, i + 1) | α,
(x, i) | Gα iff ∀ j ∈ N[i  j implies (x, j) | α],
(x, i) | Fα iff ∃ j ∈ N[i  j and (x, j) | α]
(and analogously for |+),
(x, i) |− Xα iff (x, i + 1) |− α,
(x, i) |− Gα iff ∃ j ∈ Nl[i  j and (x, j) |− α],
(x, i) |− Fα iff ∀ j ∈ Nl[i  j implies (x, j) |− α].
The reason of the failure of the completeness proof is that in the proof of Lemmas 17 and 32, the cases for α ≡ Gβ and
α ≡ Fβ , respectively, require the following facts:
 Xiβ,Xi+1β,Xi+2β, . . . ,∞ ⇒ XiGβ
where the antecedent is an inﬁnite sequence of formulas, and
 XiFβ ⇒ Xiβ ∨ Xi+1β ∨ Xi+2β ∨ · · ·∞
where the succedent is an inﬁnite disjunction of formulas. Thus, in order to obtain completeness, the notion of a sequent
should be extended to encompass inﬁnite sequents that permit us to have inﬁnite antecedents. Moreover, inﬁnite disjunc-
tions should be allowed, and the treatment of unbounded display calculi would require inﬁnite conjunctions as well. By
imposing these modiﬁcations, the completeness theorems can be obtained, but the corresponding logics may differ from
IB[ω], PB[ω], δIB[ω], and δPB[ω]. Moreover, the cut–elimination theorems for the corresponding sequent calculi with these
modiﬁcations cannot be shown. The reason of the failure of the cut–elimination proof is that the inﬁnite antecedents require
an inﬁnite version of the cut rule of the form:
Γ ⇒ α  ⇒ Σ
Γ,∗ ⇒ Σ (ω-cut)
where  contains α (it can appear inﬁnitely many times), and ∗ is obtained from  by deleting all occurrences of α.
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